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Collaboration in innovation between firms and other organizations is essential for the creation, transfer and absorption of new knowledge as it reduces the risk and complexity involved in the innovation process. Collaboration partners may include other firms within an enterprise group, up-stream suppliers, downstream customers, competitors, the government and universities and other research institutes. This study includes foreign ownership and analyzes collaboration in innovation within a cross-section of 13 countries, and considers whether differences across countries are important. When all firms are included in the analysis, foreign ownership increases the likelihood of international collaboration but decreases the likelihood of local collaboration, correcting for firm size, age, industry, location, internal R&D activity, and other aspects of the innovative behaviour of enterprises. However, when firms that carry out their own R&D activities and collaborate internationally increases the likelihood of collaborating locally, which suggests that locally-owned firms that collaborate internationally are an important source of technical knowledge from abroad. The analysis suggests that there is much heterogeneity within each country as well as each industry, and that national innovation policies and other policies related to foreign ownership should follow a more horizontal general approach.
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Collaboration in Innovation and Foreign Ownership Across EuropE





Innovation collaboration between firms and other organizations is essential for the creation, transfer and absorption of new knowledge and ultimately economic growth. Collaboration is important because it reduces the risk and complexity involved in the development of new products and processes by spreading it among several partners with agreed complementary aims. It often entails the development and acquisition of new capabilities, as each agreement involves a shared commitment of resources and knowledge (Penrose 1959; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003), and it is closely related to Lundvall’s (1998) idea of ‘learning by interacting’. Cooperation between firms and other organizations also represents the formalized links or global networks in which individual firms operate, and may include agreements within an enterprise group, up-stream suppliers, downstream customers, competitors, the government and universities and other research institutes. Often the form of ownership and the location of a partner in the network can have important consequences.
The Community Innovation Survey (CIS) provides a way to measure collaboration between firms and firms with other organizations. Questions in the survey capture all forms of cooperation associated with innovative activities, including the development of new technology, new services and new ways to combine existing products and services. While the literature on collaboration to develop new technology is large (see Dodgson, 1993; Arora and Gambardella 1994, Colombo 1995, Veugelers 1997, Nooteboom 1999, Tether 2002, Miotti and Sachwald 2003, Becker and Dietz 2004 and Negassi 2004), there have been very few studies that focus on collaboration in innovation, and even fewer that use the CIS survey to measure this activity at the firm level. This study develops a model of collaboration in innovation that is similar to the firm-level analysis of the Czech Republic carried out by Knell and Srholec (2006), which was based on the analysis of international technology diffusion in Belgium by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) and Veugelers and Cassiman (2004). These papers show that it is possible to measure knowledge flows between different enterprises directly instead of using more indirect measures as those used by the production function approach. 
An important novelty of this study is that it analyzes collaboration in innovation within the group of 13 countries and considers whether differences across these countries and group of countries are important. Being part of a multinational group of enterprises opens up different possibilities for collaboration in innovation and knowledge transfer, so this study includes foreign ownership at every level of analysis. When all firms are included in the analysis, foreign ownership increases the likelihood of international collaboration but decreases the likelihood of local collaboration, correcting for firm size, age, industry, location, internal R&D activity, and other aspects of the innovative behaviour of enterprises. Yet the analysis finds that firms that carry out their own R&D activities and collaborate internationally increases the likelihood of collaborating locally, which suggests that locally-owned firms that collaborate internationally are an important source of technical knowledge from abroad.
This study is organized as follows. Section two discusses some important issues brought up in the literature that relate to technological collaboration and technology transfer when there are multinational corporations. Section three summarizes and discusses the Eurostat anonymised innovation survey. The fourth section develops a simple probit model that captures own R&D activity, and both international and domestic collaboration, with foreign-ownership included. Section five analyzes the results for obtained from the model for individual countries and different groups of countries. The study concludes with some remarks on the issue of technological collaboration and foreign ownership across different European countries. 
2. Innovation collaboration and technology transfer
The creation, transfer and absorption of new knowledge depend on a wide variety of innovation-related activities, including in-house and acquired R&D, internal and external training, product-embodied knowledge diffusion, acquisition of external knowledge and other activities. Both Penrose (1959) and Nonaka, Toyama and Nagata (2000) point out that firms build on strategic capabilities, containing elements of tacit knowledge, which encourages the need to pool resources with other organizations so as to access knowledge complementary to their own knowledge base. Technological collaboration facilitates the learning process within firms by providing a way for them to observe how other firms perform and better access to specific project-based knowledge (Dodgson, 1996). It is also important for the overall performance of the firm because it improves their ability to deal with complexity, improve the scale and scope of innovative activities and reduce the risk and uncertainty associated with product innovation (Dodgson, 2000). 
Following the footsteps of Alfred Marshall (1890, 1919), Richardson (1972) was one of the first to observe the increasing importance of collaborations, and the relationship they play in industrial organization: 
Firms are not islands but are linked together in patterns of co-operation and affiliation. Planned co-ordination does not stop at the frontiers of the individual firm but can be effected through co-operation between firms... inter-firm co-operation is concerned very often with the transfer, exchange or pooling of technology... new products also frequently require the co-operation of firms with different capabilities (Richardson 1972: 888-95).
Economic theory has tended to neglect these issues, and focus more on the competitive nature of the economy. It is possible to use transaction cost analysis, as developed by Coase (1937) and Williamson 1975, to explain how and why market-failures can lead to more collaboration and alliances, but the approach focuses on the allocation of resources rather than the creation of resources. By contrast, evolutionary perspectives and the innovation systems approach recognize the ability of firms to capitalize on external knowledge embedded in local social networks (Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993 and Edquist 1997). Firms are organizations that are essential to the creation and transformation of resources, including the creation, transfer and absorption of new knowledge, which requires certain a strategic behaviour (Chesnais, 1992). History and location shape the innovation behaviour of firms as their ability to absorb and create new knowledge evolve along path-dependent national and sectoral trajectories. Even if firms invest abroad, their knowledge base remains embedded in the local innovation systems (Pavitt and Patel 1999). As Richardson (1972: 895) concluded:
It seems to me that we cannot hope to construct an adequate theory of industrial organisation, unless the elements of organisation, knowledge, experience and skills are brought back to the foreground of our vision.
Technological collaboration has been growing in importance because of the increasing complexity of research, heightening global competition and rapid technology progress. Empirical evidence on strategic alliances broadly confirms the increasing trend of collaboration in technology development in the global economy (Hagedoorn, 2002; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003). Firms have a strategic incentive to become involved in a global network to gain reciprocal access to knowledge, that is, firms share their knowledge to acquire useful knowledge in return. The partner has to offer knowledge superior to existing capabilities of the cooperating firm, which suggests that technology collaboration between locally and foreign-owned firms is by far less likely in countries in large distance from the technology frontier.
Collaboration can be seen as an extension of Adam Smith’s ideas of the division of labour. Cook (2004) uses the term ‘collaborative manufacturing’ to describe the idea that value chains are the principal driver of new, more collaborative relationships between customers and suppliers. These collaborative relationships tend to appear different in industries with supply chains organized in more global networks. Gertler (2004) points out that systems of innovation and production have become more social in nature as production systems are increasingly characterized by a more finely articulated social division of labour, achieved through the process of vertical disintegration of large firms and the growing use of various forms of outsourcing. 
An important strategic issue for the firm is the choice between local and global partners for collaboration. If firms are strongly embedded in the local social environment, they tend to cooperate with partners in their local proximity, provided they have the needed complementary resources. If these complementary resources do not exist locally, firms are more likely to collaborate with foreign partners. Lundvall (1988) points out that organization proximity through foreign ownership may overcome geographical and cultural distance, which suggests that foreign-owned firms should have easier access to collaboration partners abroad. Foreign-owned firms have an inherent advantage to access foreign sources of technological knowledge through other firms in the group and parents abroad.
Large multinational corporations are often seen at the centre of a collaborative agreement. Yet, there has relatively little discussion in the literature on technology flows through these agreements. Studies using firm-level data, which regress total factor productivity on penetration of foreign-owned firms in the industry, typically find little evidence of technology spillovers due to foreign ownership (Görg and Greenaway 2002), but there is strong evidence of technology transfer (Damijan, et al., 2003). This appears consistent with the proposition that multinational corporations tend to limit spillovers of their knowledge base to non-affiliated firms to protect their ownership advantages (Dunning 1988 and Caves 1996). As they aim to exploit their superior knowledge base through direct investment abroad, they should be expected to channel knowledge from the parent to the local subsidiary, but protect it from spilling over to the host economy. And as mentioned above, foreign ownership can be both a complement and a substitute to technological collaboration, depending on the national and sectoral system of innovation. 
3.  The sample 
This study relies on the Eurostat Community Innovation Statistics anonymised micro-database covering 15 countries.​[1]​ We included 13 of these countries in the analysis: Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Norway, Spain, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Romania. Greece was excluded because it was not possible to distinguish between international and national collaboration and data from Iceland was not used due to incomplete information for too many firms. Firms were asked about their activities aimed at generating new product and process innovation over years 1998 to 2000, the exception being that Norway, the Czech Republic Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia covered the period from 1999 to 2001, Romania covered the period from 2000 to 2002, and Bulgaria covered the period from 2001 to 2003. Data for each country was gathered through a national survey employing a harmonized methodology and a single base questionnaire developed by Eurostat. The definitions of innovation follow the recommendations provided by the Oslo manual (OECD, 1997).
Besides information on size, age, ownership, industry and location of the firms, the data set provides direct and firm-specific evidence on internal R&D activity as a measure of local technology (and absorptive) capability; innovation collaboration as a channel of technology transfer within and across national borders; importance of external information sources for innovation as a measure of an ability to take advantage of pool of relevant external knowledge; the use of methods to protect intramural innovations and finally importance of various obstacles that hinder innovation activity of the firms in question (see Appendix 1 for overview of the variables).
We measure size of the company by the variable SIZE, which is turnover in euro at the beginning of the period (in logs).​[2]​ The variable NEW indicates whether the firm was established during the period. The binary variable FOR takes the value of 1, when the firm is foreign-owned. We use the question posed in the innovation survey that asked whether an enterprise is part of an enterprise group and where the head office is located to determine if it is a foreign subsidiary. The binary variable R&D takes the value of 1 for firms that indicated to be continuously engaged in intramural R&D.
The focal point of our analysis is collaboration as a mean to obtain innovation-relevant knowledge (which most often is technological knowledge) from abroad and the local economy. Collaboration means active participation in joint R&D and other innovation projects with other organisations (either other enterprises or non-commercial institutions). Our measure of technology transfer within the national economy is a binary variable COOPnat with the value 1 for firms that reported having a partner for innovation collaboration in the country included in the analysis. And the measure of access to international technology is a binary variable COOPint with value 1 for firms that reported having a partner for innovation collaboration abroad. Eight different types of partners for innovation collaboration were identified in the questionnaire: (1) internal to the enterprise group; (2) upstream suppliers; (3) downstream customers; (4) competitors; (5) consultants; (6) R&D laboratories; (7) universities; and (8) public or non-profit research institutes. It is important to note that we exclude collaboration with a partner internal to the enterprise group, as we want to focus on external transfer to the firm. The reason for ignoring the internal partner is to avoid interaction with the FOR variable, as the foreign-owned firms are part of a foreign group by definition.
An important catalyst for external innovation collaboration is firm’s awareness on a pool of knowledge available outside of its borders. The survey provides information on perceived importance of external information sources for innovation from other firms (suppliers, customers and competitors) and scientific institutions (universities and R&D laboratories). Firms were asked to give score on each of the five sources on a scale from 0 (unimportant) to 3 (highly important). Since importance of these information sources perceived by firms tends to be highly correlated, we use factor analysis to reduce the information in order to avoid problems with multicolinearity in the regression estimate (see Appendix 2 for results of the factor analysis). The factor score on INFOext is used in the model to capture the importance of external sources of information used for the development and introduction of new products and processes.
Firms use various methods for controlling the amount of information that spills over their boundaries. Ability to appropriate intramural inventions and innovations gives a firm better position to capitalize not only on its own innovative activity but also on innovation collaboration. The survey allows us to detect whether the firms had valid patents at the end of the period. To measure the appropriability conditions we use the binary variable PROTECT with the value 1 if the firm reported having at least one valid patent. 
Finally, when we study the sample in the aggregate, we control for differences in technology opportunities across industries and countries. The industry-specific factors are captured by a set of industry dummies that broadly correspond to 2-digit alphabetical level of NACE (rev. 1.1) (see Appendix 1 for further identification of the variables). Since we include 13 countries in our analysis, we also have to control for differences across countries. These dummies are introduced in all of the equations.
4.  The econometric model 
A qualitative response model is ideal for capturing information contained in the Community Innovation Survey as it asks whether the enterprise enters into some kind of collaborative agreement. In our example, the decision to carry out own R&D activity or enter into a cooperative arrangement corresponds to Y=1. This gives the probability that Y=1 is chosen conditional on the explanatory variables. Assuming a normal probability distribution, we define a probit model in the form of: 
P(y=1|x) = Φ(xß),
where Φ is the standard cumulative normal probability distribution and ß are unknown parameters. We use a maximum likelihood estimator because it is the most precise estimator when there are large samples such as in our case.
	The econometric model developed in this paper is similar to the one developed by Veugelers and Cassiman (2004). To maintain comparability we consider three direct influences that multinational corporations can have on the transfer of technology: (1) effects of foreign ownership on internal R&D activity; (2) importance of foreign-owned firms for international technology transfer, and (3) role of foreign ownership for local technology diffusion. We depart from their model, however, for two interrelated reasons. First, the questionnaire used for the third Community Innovation Survey included different questions about international technology transfer as compared with the first Community Innovation Survey. As a consequence, Veugelers and Cassiman (2004) focused primarily on arms-length transfer of technology through market transactions such as licensing or R&D contracting. We are mainly concerned with collaboration, which is an inter-firm relation in the whole continuum between the both extremes of hierarchy versus market, which has become increasingly important in the knowledge-based economy of late nineties. Indeed, a purely “off-the shelf” purchase of technology is rather rare in reality as most of the knowledge transfer requires interaction (and collaboration) between users and producers of technology in one form or another (as argued by Lundvall 1988). Hence, the innovation collaboration covers much broader phenomena including some of the arms-length transactions on the technology market. 
	In our analysis we distinguish between collaboration within the multinational firm and other foreign partners. By contrast, Veugelers and Cassiman (2004) used measure of international technology transfer that does not allow for this distinction. In reality, technology transfer that includes the link between foreign parent and local subsidiary is highly related to the variable on foreign ownership, which can cause problems since foreign ownership is the key variable in the model. A large part of the international technology transfer can occur between the parent and subsidiary. The measure of global collaboration allows us to separate this kind of technology transfer and filter out the interaction between foreign ownership and collaboration with the foreign headquarters in our estimates.
	To examine whether foreign-owned firms are more likely to collaborate in the local economy, we first explore which firm’s characteristics influence probability to engage in own R&D activity and global collaboration agreements in equations (1) and (2). After controlling for these factors, we investigate the role of the foreign ownership on the local collaboration in equation (3).
	Equation (1) captures the probability of carrying out own R&D activity: 
R&D = am + bmSIZE + cmNEW + dmFOR + emINDdummies + fmCOdummies + eR&D	(1)
In this model, large firms can enjoy economies of scale of various kinds. We expect that the probability of having own R&D activity (or at least one collaboration in the following) increase with the size of the firm. The size variable appears as a natural logarithm because we expect non-linearity to be involved in these relations. Since established firms are more likely to be engaged in R&D activity, we include the variable NEW to capture maturity (life-cycle) of the firm. In the specific case of foreign affiliates, this variable is also expected to at least partly control for a possible difference between recently established greenfield projects and mergers and acquisitions. The variables for size and age are also included in the following specifications essentially for the same reasons as above.
	Foreign ownership is essential to every equation. Here it captures strategy of multinational corporations with regards to internationalization of their R&D activities. Negative coefficient of the ownership variable would suggest that the foreign-owned firms are restricted to using technology developed by their parent multinationals abroad, while positive sign would suggest that foreign investment contribute to developing R&D capabilities in the host country. Recent empirical evidence suggests increasing trend in foreign direct investment in R&D activities (see Le Bas and Sierra 2002), but such investment tends to be concentrated mainly between countries with already highly developed technological capabilities (see Verspagen and Schoenmakers 2004). Since many of the countries included in our analysis are below the technology frontier, our expectation of the impact of the foreign ownership on internal R&D activity is not clear. 
	Equation (2) captures transfer of technology from abroad as a consequence of international collaboration in innovation (COOP):
COOPint = an + bnSIZE + cnNEW + dnFOR + enINFOext + fnR&D + gneR&D + hnINDdummies + inCOdummies + eCOOPint	(2)
Besides the size, newness and foreign ownership, this equation includes the importance of external information sources for innovation, own R&D activity and its residual from the previous equation as explanatory variables. Foreign ownership also provides a key link to international collaboration. Openness of a firm to external sources of knowledge is expected to serve as a catalyst of innovation collaboration. We also expect the own R&D capability to be important in explaining the global collaboration activity. Following Cohen and Levinthal (1989 and 1990), own R&D activity is not carried out solely to create new technology in-house but also to enhance capability of a firm to absorb technology from outside (and abroad). Own R&D capability allows firms to scan external pools of knowledge and integrate it into its own R&D efforts. For example, own R&D activity of foreign-owned firms can be directed towards adjustment of the parent’s technology to the local factor endowments and customer’s tastes, etc. (so-called asset exploiting versus asset augmenting foreign investment in R&D – see Dunning and Narula 1995; Kuemmerle, 1997, Patel and Vega 1999). 
	Finally, equation (3) captures technology transfer through foreign ownership to the local economy in terms of innovation cooperation with national firms and organizations:
COOPnat = ap + bpSIZE + cpNEW + dpFOR + epPROTECT+ fpCOOPint + gpeCOOPint + hpINDdummies + ipCOdummies + λINNOVheckman + eCOOPnat	(3)
Besides the size, newness, foreign ownership, the explanatory variables include the appropriability conditions as well as global innovation collaboration and generalized residuals from the previous equation again. The focus of this equation is whether foreign-owned firms are more or less likely to transfer technology through innovation collaboration to the local economy, after correcting for the other determining factors (also from the previous equations through inclusion of the residuals).​[3]​ Foreign-owned firms that cooperate in the host economy provide an opportunity for the local firms to obtain technology from abroad. Since this opportunity implies that the foreign-owned firms have easier access to technology abroad, we also examine the role of international collaboration for explaining the probability that a firm will engage in local innovation collaboration.​[4]​  It will allow us to decide whether any effect of the foreign ownership is due to easier access to international technological know-how for foreign-owned firms or rather due to the foreign ownership itself. Finally, experience in the protection of inventions through patenting may encourage firms to engage more actively in innovation collaboration since they have learnt how to effectively prevent technology spillovers though it can slow technology transfer to the local economy. 
	The model was constructed so that each independent variable becomes a dependent variable in the subsequent equations. By the substituting, we can acquire a reduced form of the model as follows:
COOPnat = amn + bmnSIZE + cmnNEW +  cmnFOR + dmnINFOext + emnPROTECT+ fmnINDdummies +gmnCOdummies + λINNOVheckman + e'COOPnat		(4)
The reduced form captures a total effect of foreign ownership on the local collaboration, while the previous equations can be used to disentangle direct and indirect effects of the foreign ownership as will be explained in more detail in the following section. 
5.  The Results
Europe as a whole. We estimate probit models using the method of maximum likelihood. The regression coefficients estimate the influence of the independent variables on the probability that the firm engages in own R&D activity and collaborate internationally or nationally. Since only the innovative firms give details on R&D activity and technological collaboration in the innovation surveys estimation of the model can be influenced by a sample selection bias. We use a probit-specific Heckman's procedure to estimate the equations (3) and (4), which are central to the analysis. Similarly to Veugelers and Cassiman (2004) we correct for the possible selection bias only in the latter equations to keep the analysis tractable. The correction for sample selection on innovative firms can be identified by variables that are available for the total sample of firms, which answered the innovation survey. Besides the dummies for foreign ownership and newness of firms and the battery of industry and country dummies, therefore we use the factor score on obstacles to innovation as the exclusion restriction in the first equation. The Heckman's correction for innovation activity is well identified by these factors.​[5]​
	Table 1 provides a descriptive overview of the sample for the 13 countries in our sample. As expected, the percentage of firms engaged in own R&D activity is much higher in the countries of western Europe that are closest to the technology frontier, and is much lower in the New Member States of eastern and central Europe. The probability of engaging in international collaboration and national collaboration does not appear to be tied directly to the level of technology. National collaboration tended to be twice as high as international collaboration. The final two columns show the number of innovating firms in the sample and the sum of weights for the innovating firms. Since coverage and response rate of the surveys differ between countries, we use weights that refer to the inverse of the so-called sampling fraction, corrected for non-response and for no longer existing enterprises to obtain unbiased results.
Table 1: Descriptive overview















Note: Averages weighted by the sampling fraction, corrected for non-response and for no longer existing enterprises (sum of the weights refers to the number of firms in the targeted population). Number of observations (and the sum of weights) refers to valid responses to the question on national collaboration.
	Figure 1 summarizes the results for the model as a whole. Foreign ownership is the main variable, which is significant in some of the estimates. When it is significant, it appears negatively related to own R&D activity and to national collaboration. As expected it is positively related to international collaboration. R&D activity is always positively related to international technological collaboration, which in turn is always positively related to national collaboration in innovation. External sources of information lead to more international collaboration in innovation and intellectual property rights protection lead to more national collaboration.​[6]​
	The results of the regression analysis are shown in tables 2 and 3. These tables show the results for the econometric model for the entire sample. To compensate for differences in the sample size across countries, the estimates in table 2 are weighed by the inverse of the sampling fraction. Marginal effects are reported, which refer to a change from 0 to 1 for the dummy variables. The results show that the size of the firm matters for whether a firm engages in own R&D activity, international collaboration and national collaboration, but that the newness of the firm is unimportant in every instance. Foreign ownership is important for both national and international collaboration, being positively related to international collaboration and negatively related to national collaboration, but it is not important for R&D activities within the country. Although not significant, foreign ownership appears to have a negative influence on own R&D activity, which means that foreign-owned firms are less likely to engage in their own R&D activity compared to local-owned firms. Nevertheless, the estimate of equation 2 confirms that own R&D activity improves absorptive capacity of a firm, which increases likelihood to engage in innovation collaboration abroad. The estimates for the unweighted sample in table 3 shows similar results, except that the newness of the firm appears much more important.
Figure 1: Summary of the regressions results 
	
	Foreign ownership is important for international collaboration as the multinational firm provides easier access to other international firms. Access to external sources of information for innovative activity also appears significant for the European economy as a whole, which may be tied to the issue of foreign ownership. By contrast, foreign-owned firms appear to have much less interest to collaborate in the host economy compared with the their local-owned counterparts, however, firms with international collaborative agreements are more much more likely to collaborate nationally. Finally, the appropriability conditions, measured by patenting track record of a firm, appear to matter for the collaboration in innovation with local partners in the European economy as a whole.
	Results of the reduced form of equation for national collaboration broadly confirm effects of the explanatory factors detected in the previous regressions. As suggested by Veugelers and Cassiman (2004), the reduced form provides a total effect of foreign ownership on local technological collaboration, which can be decomposed into direct and indirect components by tracing the effects of foreign ownership through the other equations, except that foreign ownership appears much less important when the sample is not weighted. The direct effect is obtained from the coefficient of the ownership variable in the third equation. The indirect effect is based on the fact that the foreign-owned firms are more likely to engage in global collaboration (the second equation), while at the same time having global partner for collaboration increases the probability to cooperate with a local partner (the third equation). We can also trace another indirect effect through the first equation, as foreign-owned firms are less likely to engage in internal R&D activity. This affects the probability to involve – ceteris paribus ​– collaboration in innovation. 
	Different types of collaboration. The innovation survey questionnaire identifies eight different types of collaboration in innovation, including collaboration with suppliers, clients or customers, competitors, consultations, research organizations, universities and other non-profit organizations. These different types are most relevant to equations (3) and (4) as they can have an important effect on national collaboration and its impact on the diffusion of technology. Table 4 shows the regression results for the different types of collaborations in equations (3) and (4). In the top half of the table (equation (3)), foreign affiliates appear significant in collaboration with organizations and not significant with other firms, and patent protection appears most important when collaboration is with research organizations (as thy try to product their intellectual property) and customers and clients (as the firm attempts to protect its intellectual property). International collaboration remains important in all types of collaboration.  When compared with table (2), foreign ownership ceases to be significant in each of the different types of collaboration in the reduced form of the model, except with consultants, and to a lesser extent with suppliers and non-profit organizations.
	Groups of European countries. Since the model can be interpreted differently depending on the level of technology in the national economy, it is useful to look at different groups of related countries. Tables 5 through 7 aggregate the 13 European economies into three groups: The original EU Member States; The 6 new EU Member States; and Bulgaria and Romania, respectively. Table 5 differs from table 2 in that foreign ownership is not important for international collaboration, which also weakens the fit in the reduced from of the model. Foreign-ownership is relatively more important for the 6 new Member States, shown in table 6, relative to the original Member States in all of the equations, and is even a highly significant for own-R&D activity (equation (1)), albeit negative. By contrast, foreign-ownership becomes relatively less important for Bulgaria and Romania, shown in table 7 although the signs are the same, and patent protection loses its significance. 




Table 2: Regressions results (13 countries, weighted)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	R&D activity	International cooperation	National cooperation	National cooperation (reduced)
Size	0.054 (9.91)***	0.013 (6.17)***	0.016 (2.09)**	0.027 (4.81)***
New	-0.023 (0.38)	0.013 (0.69)	0.104 (1.39)	0.112 (1.54)
Foreign affiliate	-0.017 (0.63)	0.023 (2.59)***	-0.120 (3.80)***	-0.071 (2.77)***
External information	..	0.020 (5.90)***	..	0.058 (5.01)***
Patent protection	..	..	0.152 (4.75)***	0.165 (5.26)***
R&D activity	..	0.044 (2.44)**	..	..
Residuals of eq. (1)	..	-0.001 (0.03)	..	..
International cooperation	..	..	0.632 (7.84)***	..
Residuals of eq (2)	..	..	-0.031 (0.70)	..
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes




Note: Marginal effects reported. Absolute value of robust z-statistics in brackets and ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Estimates weighted by the sampling fraction, corrected for non-response and for no longer existing enterprises. Marginal effects refer to discrete change from 0 to 1 in dummies.

Table 3: Regressions results (13 countries, unweighted)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	R&Dactivity	International cooperation	National cooperation	National cooperation(reduced)
Size	0.059 (17.10)***	0.021 (9.78)***	0.004 (0.93)	0.022 (6.84)***
New	0.063 (2.35)**	0.028 (1.66)*	-0.038 (1.45)	-0.012 (0.51)
Foreign affiliate	0.006 (0.46)	0.073 (7.32)***	-0.112 (7.80)***	-0.025 (1.94)*
External information	..	0.051 (14.97)***	..	0.105 (19.87)***
Patent protection	..	..	0.119 (9.94)***	0.140 (12.64)***
R&D activity	..	0.142 (9.03)***	..	..
Residuals of eq. (1)	..	-0.030 (1.82)*	..	..
International cooperation	..	..	0.756 (26.02)***	..
Residuals of eq (2)	..	..	-0.123 (5.33)***	..
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes




Note: Same as Table 2.

Table 4: Regressions results (all countries, weighted)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Suppliers	Clients or customers	Competitors	Consultants	Commercial laboratories or R&D enterprises	Universities or other higher education institutes	Non-profit research institutes
Equation (3)
Size	0.011 (2.52)**	0.003 (0.83)	0.006 (1.72)*	0.007 (1.20)	0.004 (0.88)	0.009 (2.73)***	0.009 (2.53)**
New	0.068 (0.92)	-0.017 (0.57)	0.028 (0.65)	0.026 (0.57)	0.030 (0.77)	0.041 (1.17)	-0.014 (0.59)
Foreign affiliate	-0.039 (1.52)	-0.06 (1.93)*	-0.045 (1.52)	-0.093 (3.50)***	-0.052 (1.65)*	-0.042 (1.95)*	-0.044 (2.58)***
Patent protection	0.030 (1.45)	0.076 (2.14)**	0.028 (1.15)	0.023 (1.06)	0.094 (2.52)**	0.099 (2.41)**	0.076 (2.76)***
International cooperation	0.190 (2.27)**	0.252 (2.69)***	0.127 (2.02)**	0.292 (6.16)***	0.251 (2.60)***	0.301 (2.69)***	0.240 (3.52)***
Residuals of eq (2)	0.007 (0.35)	-0.010 (0.42)	0.027 (1.03)	-0.053 (1.73)*	-0.060 (1.87)*	-0.070 (1.94)*	-0.055 (2.18)**
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes




Table 4: Regressions results (all countries, weighted), cont.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Suppliers	Clients or customers	Competitors	Consultants	Commercial laboratories or R&D enterprises	Universities or other higher education institutes	Non-profit research institutes
Equation (4)
Size	0.017 (3.15)***	0.011 (3.15)***	0.009 (2.36)**	0.018 (3.94)***	0.011 (2.46)**	0.013 (2.70)***	0.011 (3.06)***
New	0.079 (1.02)	-0.006 (0.19)	0.026 (0.68)	0.028 (0.67)	0.033 (0.94)	0.038 (1.22)	-0.002 (0.10)
Foreign-ownership	-0.030 (1.49)	-0.045 (1.92)*	-0.029 (1.39)	-0.070 (2.89)***	-0.020 (1.06)	-0.012 (1.02)	-0.014 (1.70)*
External information	0.027 (2.62)	0.043 (3.09)***	0.031 (2.11)**	0.043 (5.44)***	0.046 (2.19)**	0.055 (2.56)**	0.038 (2.85)***
Patent protection	0.045 (2.14)**	0.086 (2.46)**	0.035 (1.43)	0.035 (1.84)*	0.072 (2.09)**	0.075 (2.20)**	0.046 (2.49)**
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes




Note: Same as Table 2.

Table 5: Regressions results (5 old EU members, weighted)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	R&Dactivity	International cooperation	National cooperation	National cooperation(reduced)
Size	0.054 (8.95)***	0.012 (7.53)***	0.017 (1.97)**	0.029 (4.77)***
New	-0.049 (0.83)	0.015 (0.78)	0.110 (1.31)	0.124 (1.55)
Foreign affiliate	-0.008 (0.25)	0.003 (0.39)	-0.106 (3.04)***	-0.062 (2.15)**
External information	..	0.016 (4.96)***	..	0.050 (3.81)***
Patent protection	..	..	0.139 (3.96)***	0.140 (3.54)***
R&D activity	..	0.026 (1.87)*	..	..
Residuals of eq. (1)	..	0.012 (1.22)	..	..
International cooperation	..	..	0.664 (5.36)***	..
Residuals of eq (2)	..	..	-0.056 (1.08)	..
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes




Note: Same as Table 2.

Table 6: Regressions results (6 new - the first wave - EU members, weighted)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	R&Dactivity	International cooperation	National cooperation	National cooperation(reduced)
Size	0.046 (7.21)***	0.164 (1.18)	-0.008 (0.88)	-0.004 (0.43)
New	0.112 (1.34)	-0.019 (0.51)	0.022 (0.30)	0.009 (0.17)
Foreign affiliate	-0.062 (2.80)***	0.084 (2.58)***	-0.178 (5.18)***	-0.099 (3.15)***
External information	..	0.041 (3.59)***	..	0.035 (2.14)**
Patent protection	..	..	0.152 (2.91)***	0.138 (3.42)***
R&D activity	..	0.148 (2.64)***	..	..
Residuals of eq. (1)	..	-0.070 (1.74)*	..	..
International cooperation	..	..	0.578 (5.04)***	..
Residuals of eq (2)	..	..	-0.056 (0.87)	..
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes




Note: Same as Table 2.


Table 7: Regressions results (2 new - the second wave - EU members (Bulgaria and Romania), weighted)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	R&Dactivity	International cooperation	National cooperation	National cooperation(reduced)
Size	0.038 (8.25)***	0.112 (2.76)***	0.005 (2.56)***	0.004 (7.07)***
New	0.011 (0.18)	-0.004 (0.14)	-0.025 (1.54)	-0.008 (2.31)**
Foreign affiliate	0.081 (1.60)	0.361 (6.87)***	-0.022 (1.45)	0.028 (3.55)***
External information	..	0.028 (4.07)***	..	0.007 (6.05)***
Patent protection	..	..	0.037 (1.53)	0.012 (3.10)***
R&D activity	..	0.127 (2.50)**	..	..
Residuals of eq. (1)	..	-0.068 (2.23)**	..	..
International cooperation	..	..	0.131 (1.71)*	..
Residuals of eq (2)	..	..	0.005 (0.35)	..
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes




Note: Same as Table 2.






























































Note: Same as Table 2.

























Using firm level data from the Third Community Innovation Survey, this study analysed differences in collaborative behaviour between foreign and domestic owned firms in 13 countries. National differences are important, but the study shows that foreign-owned firms are more likely to cooperate with external partners abroad but less likely to collaborate locally, in general. The results confirm that having easier access to international collaboration, foreign-owned firms have fewer incentives to collaborate in the host country, especially if the local environment does not provide attractive opportunities for such collaboration, which was the case in every industry studied. Our results broadly confirm the previous findings by Veugelers and Cassiman (2004) and Knell and Srholec (2006, 2008) at the European level, but many of the variables included in the model have a much weaker correlation at the national level.
	The analysis also suggests that firms collaborating on a global scale are much more likely to collaborate locally. This conclusion suggests that collaborative arrangements with foreign partners are important for the transfer of foreign knowledge to the local economy regardless of the local or foreign ownership of the firms. This is especially true of the science-based industries. The policy implication is that collaboration in innovation with foreign partners is an effective way to encourage international technological transfer, and it does not depend on foreign direct investment. 
		By using the CIS anonymised micro-database, we were able to analyze firm-level variables with discrete outcomes across 13 countries and by industry. This is important because there is so much heterogeneity across European firms and countries. Confidentiality requirements of each individual country make such analysis difficult. Nevertheless, this line of research is very promising, but would require a return to the individual country level since it is not possible to integrate the micro-aggregated dataset with any other database. 
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Table A1: Definitions of firm specific variables
SIZE	Log of micro-aggregated turnover in EUR at the beginning of the period. Since the minimum value of turnover is zero (firms without sales in the given year), unity has been added to each observation before computing the nature logarithm.
NEW	Binary variable with value 1 if the firm was established over the period
FOR	Binary variable with value 1 if the firm is affiliated to a group with a head office abroad
R&D	Binary variable with value 1 when the company has continuous intramural R&D activities
COOPnat	Binary variable with value 1 for innovative firms that have innovation collaboration with a non-affiliated partner in the national economy (without other companies in the group)
COOPint	Binary variable with value 1 for innovative firms that have innovation collaboration with a non-affiliated partner abroad (without other companies in the group)
PROTECT	Binary variable with value 1 for companies that had valid patents at the end of the period
INFOext	Factor scores on the following external sources of information: suppliers of equipment, materials, components or software; clients or customers; competitors and other enterprises from the same industry; universities or other higher education institutes and government or private non-profit research institutes. The variables were on a scale from 0 (unimportant) to 3 (highly important).
OBSTACLE	Factors score on the following external obstacles to innovation:  excessive perceived risks; innovation costs too high; lack of appropriate sources of finance; insufficient flexibility of regulations and finally lack of customer’s responsiveness to innovated products. The factor analysis estimate came out with a single principal factor with eigenvalue higher than one. The obstacles were on a scale from 0 (unimportant) to 3 (highly important).
Industry dummies	Dummy variables for 18 industries broadly according to 2-digit alphabetical NACE, rev. 1.1 classification.
Country dummies	Dummy variables for location of the firm in Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Norway, Spain, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Romania





Competitors or firms in the same industry	0.53
Universities and other higher education 	0.59
Government or non-profit research institutes	0.54
Professional conferences, journals, etc.	0.67
Fairs and exhibitions	0.61
Note: Number of observations is 14,733; one factor with eigenvalue > 1 was detected (eigenvalues: 2.09; 0.52; 0.24; -0.08; -0.19; -0.21; -0.23); extraction method: principal factors.


Table A3: Factor analysis on external obstacles to innovation
	Factor loadings
Excessive perceived economic risks	0.78
Innovation costs too high	0.83
Lack of appropriate sources of finance	0.75
Insufficient flexibility of regulations or standards	0.64
Lack of customer responsiveness to new goods or services	0.63





















^1	  Source of the microdata is European Commission, Eurostat, Community Innovation Statistics, Third Community Innovation Survey. Eurostat has no responsibility for the results and conclusions in this paper.
^2	  Note that no information on the number of employees is available in the micro dataset from Eurostat.
^3	  Nevertheless, equation (3) may also be a direct measure for exploiting the host economies knowledge sources so as to transfer this knowledge into the global innovation activities of a multinational firm. Interpreting collaboration between a foreign subsidiary and local firms and organizations as knowledge transfer from abroad (and not as knowledge sourcing is more likely to be valid in the case of low-technologies economies such as the new member states and southern European economies) and less valid in the case of high-technology economies
^4	  Causality can be the other way around. Often national collaboration eases entry into international collaboration.
^5	  Similarly to the information on sources of information for innovation, answers of firms on importance of the various obstacles tend to be highly correlated. Hence we use factors score on the external obstacles to innovation in the regression. (See Appanedix Table A1 for definition.) Results of the factors analysis on obstacles as well as the first equation in the Heckman selection models are available from the authors upon request.
^6	  Since coverage and response rate of the surveys differ between countries, we use weights that refer to the inverse of the so-called sampling fraction, corrected for non-response and for no longer existing enterprises to obtain unbiased results.
